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Abstract A new and acute management problem, now the focus of a major
U.N. conference, has arisen in recent years in international fisheries. The
problem concerns the management of transboundary fishery resources, in the
form of resources to be found in both the coastal state EEZ and the adjacent
high seas. The resources are commonly referred to as "straddling" stocks.
This article provides a preliminary exploration ofthe management issue. It
reviews the historical and legal background and asks how far the now well
developed economic analysis of the management of transboundary fishery
resources in the form of resources "shared" by two or more coastal states will
take us in examining this second and more recent transboundary fishery man-
agement problem. The answer is a very limited distance only. The article
concludes by pointing to questions arising from this resource management
issue demanding further research.
Keywords Transboundary fishery resources, straddling stocks, theory of dy-
namic games.
Introduction
In December 1992, the United Nations agreed that an intergovernmental confer-
ence should be held on high seas fishery resources. It is planned that the confer-
ence should commence by mid-1993 and that the conference should have its final
session before the end of 1994.
The call for the conference came from the United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The call
reflected growing concern over an increasingly important and troublesome inter-
national fisheries management issue, namely the management of high seas fishery
resources, particularly those to be found in both the high seas adjacent to an
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the EEZ itself. At the close of the U.N.
Third Law ofthe Sea Conference in 1982, the issue had seemed minor. A decade
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later, the issue was seen as posing a threat to the New Law of the Sea itself
(Munro, 1992b).
In this paper, we shall discuss the background to the issue and offer a prelim-
inary exploration of some of the economic aspects of the problem. In no sense do
we pretend to offer a complete economic analysis. On the contrary, we devote a
considerable part of our effort to pointing to the many areas where economic
research is still required. Moreover, we would also warn that important aspects of
the problem must be seen as being in a state of flux, since the surrounding legal
framework is bound to be influenced by the forthcoming U.N. conference.
The Historical Background to and the Legal Aspects of the High Seas
Fisheries Management Issue
The Law of the Sea Convention, which was presented for signing at the close of
the U.N. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea in December 1982, has yet to
be declared international treaty law. That part of the Convention pertaining to
fisheries, however. Part V, The Exclusive Economic Zone, has been implemented
so widely that it was long ago declared to have achieved the status of customary
international law (Munro, 1992b). Part V of the Convention can thus be seen as
providing the "rules of the game" for international fisheries management.
The Law of the Sea Convention, as set forth in 1982, provides the coastal state
with what are essentially full property rights to the fishery resources within the
200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The key article, Article 56, states that,
within the EEZ, the coastal state has
"sovereign rights for the purpose of ... exploiting, conserving and manag-
ing the natural resources, whether living or non-living . . ."'
The one apparently unsettled issue in 1982 concerned coastal state rights with
respect to highly migratory species within EEZ. There was an active debate
during the Conference over whether highly migratory species (tuna in particular)
were the exception to the rule of coastal states property rights to fishery resources
within the EEZ. The United States, in particular, argued that highly migratory
species were indeed an exception that should remain as international common
property to be managed by international organizations, in which distant water
fishing nations, as well as coastal states, would have a significant management
role. The debate within the Conference led to a compromise article in Part V of the
Convention, Article 64. The article was to be a source of controversy for years
after the close of the Conference.
Article 64 contains two apparently contradictory paragraphs. Paragraph 1 of
Article 64 states that, where no international organizations exist to manage the
resources, the relevant coastal states should cooperate "with other states whose
nationals fish these resources," i.e., distant water fishing nations in particular, to
establish such organizations.-^ It was clearly understood that distant water fishing
nations should have the power within these organizations to influence the man-
agement of the relevant fishery resources. Such international organizations,
' U.N., "Convention on the Law of the Sea," Article 56.
^ U.N., "Convention on the Law of the Sea," Article 64.High Seas Fisheries Management 315
which confer powers of management upon distant water fishing nations, are now
commonly referred to as "Article 64 organizations."
Paragraph 2 of Article 64 states that Paragraph 1 ofthe article is to "apply in
addition to other provisions of the Part [V]."' Coastal states interpreted this
paragraph to imply that Article 56 applied to highly migratory species as well as
other species. That is to say, within the EEZ, the coastal state was to be seen to
have sovereign rights with respect to the management and exploitation of highly
migratory species that are present in the EEZ. This interpretation was in direct
contradiction of the interpretation which distant water fishing nations, e.g. the
United States, placed on Paragraph 1. The distant water fishing nations saw
Paragraph 1 as granting themselves influence over the management of the highly
migratory resources within, as well as without, the EEZ (Burke, 1984).
Over time, the distant water fishing nations appeared to give up the struggle.
By the tum of the decade, the United States, as leader in the cause of distant
water fishing management rights over highly migratory species, had conceded that
coastal states did indeed have full property rights to highly migratory species
within the EEZ (Munro, 1990a; U.N., 1992).
The Article 64 controversy had subsided, or so it seemed. Yet the dispute was
to re-emerge in the context of high seas fisheries management. Article 64 is still
very much with us.
The one area covered imperfectly by Part V ofthe Law ofthe Sea Convention
was high seas fisheries. One possible explanation for this lack of attention is that,
in December, 1982, high seas fisheries were deemed to be of minor importance. It
was maintained at the time that not less than 90 per cent of the world's ocean
harvest of fish was accounted for by fishery resources encompassed by the newly
established, or about to be established, EEZs. What was left over seemed of little
consequence (Munro, 1992b). Moreover, it is reasonable to conjecture that many
coastal states believed that distant water fishing nations could exploit on a com-
mercial basis fishery resources in the high seas adjacent to the EEZs, only ifthey
were granted access to the EEZs as well. Thus the coastal state had the whip
hand, or so it appeared.
The articles in Part V most relevant to high seas fisheries are Articles 63, 64,
65, 66, 67, 87 and 116-120. The high seas threat to anadromous species was
explicitly recognized at the Conference. This is dealt with in Article 66, which
contains the State of Origin Principle, i.e, states of origin bear primary respon-
sibility for the stocks. Customary international law now appears to dictate that
directed anadromous fisheries {e.g. salmon fisheries) on the high seas is to be
deemed illegal. The status of non-directed anadromous fisheries, i.e. bycatches, is
somewhat murkier (Burke, 1991). Article 67 applies the same principles to ca-
tadromous stocks."
With respect to all other high seas fishery resources, what are of primary
concern, are not stocks wholly confined to the high seas, but rather those to be
found in both the EEZ and the adjacent high seas. These have now come to be
subdivided by the international lawyers and others into highly migratory species
' Ihid.
'* Catadromous species are the reverse to anadromous species. Catadromous species
spawn in the sea, but spend most of their life cycle in fresh water. Commercially, they are
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and "straddling" stocks. Highly migratory species, e.g. tuna, do, by their very
nature, move between the EEZs and the adjacent high seas. The term "strad-
dling" stocks can be viewed as a catchall term. It includes all stocks, other than
highly migratory, anadromous and catadromous stocks, to be found in both the
EEZ and the adjacent high seas. An example is provided by particular ground-
fish stocks on the Grand Bank off Newfoundland. The boundary of Canada's
Atlantic Coast EEZ slices off two segments of the Grand Bank in the east
and south, popularly referred to as the Nose and Tail of the Bank, respectively.
There are significant groundfish stocks found both within that part of the Grand
Bank encompassed by Canada's EEZ and in the Nose or in the Tail of the
Grand Bank.
Article 87, the Ereedom ofthe High Seas article, grants all states freedom to
fish on the remaining high seas, subject to other provisions in Part V of the
Convention, and with the admonition that states fishing on the high seas shall do
so '"with due regard for the interests of other States"* (e.g. coastal states).
Articles 63 and 64 admonish coastal states and other relevant states to coop-
erate in order to ensure the conservation of "straddling" stocks (Article 63) and
highly migratory species found in both the EEZ and adjacent high seas (Article
64). The two articles provide virtually nothing in terms of direction or guidance.
Article 65 applies the same admonition to marine mammals.
Articles 116-120 specifically address the issue ofthe conservation and man-
agement of high seas fishery resources, and by implication, the division of rights
and responsibilities between coastal states and those distant water fishing nations
operating in the adjacent high seas. The key article. Article 116, re-states the right
of all states to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to (inter alia) "the rights
and duties as well as interests of coastal states. . . ."^
In a widely cited, much praised, and much attacked, article, Edward Miles
and William Burke maintain that "Article 116 establishes that the coastal state
has the superior right, duty and interest in straddling stocks beyond the EEZ."
(Miles and Burke, 1989, p. 349). The authors go on to concede, however that "the
precise distribution of competences to make these [coastal state right, duty and
interest] is not prescribed . . ." (Miles and Burke, 1989, p. 343). In short. Articles
116-120 are together a model of vagueness and imprecision. It is now generally
agreed that the high seas fisheries management issue constitutes part ofthe "un-
finished business" ofthe U.N. Third Law ofthe Sea Conference (Kwiatkowska,
1992).
The "unfinished business" would have been unimportant if high seas fisheries
issues had continued to be a matter of minor concern. The issues did not remain
minor, however. Rather, they became a cause of steadily increasing concern
during the 1980s and on into the 1990s. Two ofthe more dramatic examples ofthe
emergence of the problem of high seas fisheries management are provided by
North American fisheries. The first involves the aforementioned "straddling"
stocks on the Grand Bank of Newfoundland. Canada had, at the inception of
Canadian Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, attempted to deal with the problem in
a sensible manner by establishing an international management body, the North-
' U.N., "Convention on the Law ofthe Sea." Article 87, paragraph 2.
* U.N., "Convention on the Law ofthe Sea." Article 116.High Seas Fisheries Management 317
west Atlantic Fisheries Organizatioti [NAFO]''. All went well for a time, but, by
the mid-1980s, the cooperative management regime showed signs of increasing
stress. The weakening of cooperation had serious resource management conse-
quences and led to a severe strain being imposed upon Canada-EC fisheries re-
lations (Applebaum, 1990; Munro, 1992a).^
The other example is provided by the immense groundfish fisheries of the
Bering Sea.^ The ground fish resources are encompassed by the American and
Russian EEZs, except for a high seas enclave popularly referred to as the Dough-
nut Hole. The Doughnut Hole, about which we shall have considerably more to
say at a later point, began to become a problem in the mid-1980s. By the early
1990s, the problem was beginning to take on the attributes of a major resource
management disaster.
The Grand Bank and the Bering Sea provide only the most dramatic examples
of high seas fisheries management problems. Similar, albeit less dramatic, exam-
ples have emerged in the Southwest Atlantic, and the East Central and Southeast
Pacific (Miles and Burke, 1989; F.A.O. ofthe U.N., 1992a). There are now clear
signs that the problem is beginning to emerge as well in the Western and Central
Pacific and in the Barent Sea.
One should also add in passing that the driftnet problem, which has been the
subject of intense, and often vitriolic, debate is to a large extent a high seas
fisheries management issue.'^ No one is seriously disputing the use of drift nets
within the EEZ.
When looking for reasons for the emergence of high seas fisheries management
problems, we should note first that the comfortable assumption to the effect that
distant water fishing nations could not operate in the adjacent high seas without
having access to the EEZs has proven to be false. Beyond that, we observe the
exclusion of distant water fieets from EEZs, often for reasons having little foun-
dation in economics, combined with the surprising lack of decline in distant water
fieet capacity since 1982 (F.A.O. ofthe U.N., 1992b). The inevitable result has
been increased pressure on high seas fishery resources.
For an example, we return to the Bering Sea groundfisheries. In 1984, the
United States undertook a determined effort to eliminate foreign fishing fleets
from its Northeast Pacific EEZ. Prior to 1984, harvests of groundfish in the
Doughnut Hole had been trivial, amounting to no more than a few thousand
tonnes per annum. By 1988. the per annum groundfish harvest in the Doughnut
Hole had risen to 1.6 million tonnes (Miles and Fluharty, 1991).
As concern about the high seas fisheries management problem intensified,
pressure mounted to have the issue addressed on an international basis. The issue
was placed on the agenda of the U.N. Conference on the Environment and De-
velopment (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in June, 1992. The Conference called
' NAFO was, in a sense, a successor to a pre-EFJ intemational fisheries commission, the
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF).
^ At the time of writing, there are signs that cooperation in returning to the NAFO region.
This will be discussed at later point. How stable such cooperation will prove to be remains
to be seen.
^ Which in terms of volume of harvest is dominated by pollock.
'" It is true that the use of driftnets has also been attacked on the grounds that the nets
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upon the U.N. to mount an intergovernmental conference on the management of
highly migratory species and straddling stocks. Six months later, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly agreed. The U.N. Conference on Highly Migratory and Straddling
Stocks Is scheduled to have a preparatory session in April, 1993, and to have its
first full session in July of that year.
Two opposing schools of thought are beginning to emerge with respect to the
management of fishery resources in the adjacent high seas. Both schools of
thought take it as obvious that the management regime for stocks in the adjacent
high seas must be the same as the management regime for those portions of the
stocks in the EEZ. The first school of thought (of which Canada is a prominent
member) supports the so-called "consistency principle."
The "consistency principle" states that the management regime applied to the
portion of the stock in the adjacent high seas must be consistent with the man-
agement regime established by the coastal state for the portion ofthe stock within
the EEZ (Kwiatkowska, 1992). The "consistency principle" probably made its
first appearance in the NAFO Convention (Article XI) (Canada. 1978).
The principle seems innocuous enough, appearing simply to repeat the obvi-
ous, namely that there cannot be a discrepancy between management regimes In
the EEZ and the adjacent high seas. If the principle stated that the management
regimes within the EEZ and in the adjacent high seas should be consistent with
one another, the principle would indeed be innocuous. That is, however, not what
the principle states. Rather the principle states that the management regime for
the adjacent high seas is to be consistent with the management regime established
within the EEZ. It is the coastal state alone which determines the latter manage-
ment regime (Article 56). By implication then, if the "consistency principle" is
accepted, the management regime applicable to the portion ofthe "straddling" or
highly migratory stock in the adjacent high seas Is to be dominated, if not wholly
determined, by the wishes and preferences ofthe coastal state.
The typical response of distant water fishing nations to the "consistency prin-
ciple" has been that the principle is a reflection of "creeping jurisdictionalism" on
the part of the coastal states. Distant water fishing nations naturally have an
incentive to press for arrangements in which they play a significant role in deter-
mining the management regime in the adjacent high seas. Yet, if such arrange-
ments were to be established, then, by implication, distant water fishing nations
would influence the management regime within the EEZ, as well as without.
Indeed, if such a cooperative management regime were administered through an
international organization, we should not hesitate to identify the organization as
an Article 64 type of organization." To many coastal states, the position of the
second school of thought, which, for want of a better term, we can label the
Article 64 school, would serve to undermine coastal state sovereignty within the
EEZ, and is thus an anathema.
It thus may well be that the positions ofthe two schools of thought are virtually
irreconcilable. As we have noted. It is the hope of the organizers of the U.N.
conference on high seas fisheries management that the last session of the confer-
ence will be held by late 1994. This hope may be decidedly optimistic.
See, for example, Japan, 1992.High Seas Fisheries Management 319
Some Initial Reflections on the Economics of High Seas
Fisheries Management
In keeping with our earlier discussion, we shall in this part ignore fishery re-
sources that are wholly confined to the high seas. Rather, we shall focus on
transboundary fishery resources to be found both within the EEZ and the adjacent
high seas.
As well as using the terms "straddling" stocks and highly migratory species,
intemational legal experts also refer to "shared" resources. By this term, they
mean transboundary fishery resources, which are "shared" by two or more
coastal states. The economics ofthe management of "shared" fishery resources
is now reasonably well developed.'^ These authors would suggest that a reason-
able approach to the question at hand would be to commence by seeing how far
the economic analysis pertaining to "shared" fishery resources will carry us in
analyzing the management of the other form of transboundary fishery resources,
i.e. fishery resources to be found in both the EEZ and the adjacent high seas.'^
Indeed the FAO implies in a recent publication (FAO 1992c) that the two issues
are, to all intents and purposes, one and the same. Hence the economic analysis
developed for the "shared" stock problem should be all that is required to ex-
amine the "straddling" stock problem.
In our initial refiections on the economics of high seas fisheries management,
we shall confine ourselves to asking how far the economic analysis of "shared"
stock management will carry us in examining the management ofthe second form
of transboundary fishery resource. If we end up disagreeing with the FAO and
conclude that the economics of "shared" stock management will carry us only
part way, then we shall be in a position to begin identifying issues demanding
further research.
We commence with one issue which certainly does not arise in the manage-
ment of "shared" resources, namely that of new entrants. One of the factors
which helped to undermine NAFO was the appearance in the Nose and Tail ofthe
Grand Bank of vessels of "new entrant," i.e. non-NAFO member, countries. As
we shall argue, under the existing Law ofthe Sea Convention, current participants
in a "straddling" stock type fishery can impose restrictions on would be "new
entrants," but they cannot bar the "new entrants" entirely.
Fishery economists scarcely need to be told the consequences of an absence
of al! barriers to "new entrants." The establishment of a management regime over
adjacent high seas fisheries, which shows promise, will attract "new entrants"
and lead to the threat of severe resource depletion.
The U.N. argues that the Law of the Sea Convention allows states currently
exploiting a "straddling" stock to establish a conservation regime and to insist
that "new entrants" abide by the regime (U.N., 1992). This, however, does not
really solve the economic problem. Ifthe existing states establish and enforce, let
us say, a TAC, but are unable to prevent "new entrants" from sharing in the
TAC, then the return from the fishery to an individual fishing nation could steadily
'^ See, for example, the survey article: Munro, 1990b.
" From here on in we shall refer to the problem of fishery resources found in both the EEZ
and the adjacent high seas, as simply the "straddling" stock problem. This will be under-
stood to Include the problem of highly migratory species crossing the EEZ boundary into
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diminish. Indeed, the situation described is uncomfortably close to that of a fish-
ery wholly confined to coastal state waters in which the coastal state authorities
establish and enforce a TAC, but exert no control over the fleet size.'*
Canada has raised for discussion a proposal which would not bar new entrants
entirely, but which would avoid the aforementioned problems. The proposal is
that the states currently exploiting a "straddling" stock could establish a man-
agement regime and then declare the fishery to be fully utilized. New entrants
would not have access to the TAC unless a state that had been exploiting the
resource agreed to relinquish its share of the TAC (Canada, 1993a). While the
Canadian proposal makes no reference to the possibility that a state currently
exploiting the resource might be persuaded to sell its share to a prospective new
entrant, the possibility obviously exists and would have interesting implications.
In any event, if the new entrant problem is mishandled, with the consequence
that the economic benefits to be obtained from cooperative high seas fisheries
management appear to be ephemeral, then the likelihood of achieving a stable
cooperative management regime will be very low indeed. Hence, it is much to be
hoped that the "new entrant" problem will be high on the agenda of the forth-
coming U.N. conference.
Suppose now, for the sake of argument, that the U.N. does somehow resolve
the "new entrant" problem and that access to a given adjacent high seas region is
restricted to one, or a few, fortunate distant water fishing nation(s). The situation
would now be somewhat closer to that of a "shared" resource, but important
differences yet remain. Not the least important of these differences pertains to
symmetry.
In the case of a "shared" resource, there is symmetry in the sense that each
coastal state has clear property rights to that portion ofthe fishery resource within
its EEZ {McRae and Munro, 1989). The fleets of one coastal state cannot harvest
the "shared" resource in the EEZ of its neighboring coastal state, without the
strict permission of that neighbouring coastal state.
If the resource in question is a "straddling" stock, or the equivalent, the
distant water fishing nation cannot enter the coastal state EEZ without coastal
state consent and permission. As the Law of the Sea Convention now stands,
however, there is no legal reason why coastal state fleets cannot enter the adja-
cent high seas region—on the contrary. Hence the coastal state-distant water
fishing nation relationship is distinctly asymmetrical.
With this in mind, let us now enquire into what insights, if any, the economics
of "shared" fishery resource management can offer us with respect to the con-
sequences of non-cooperation in the management of "straddling" stocks. We
remind ourselves that most of the economic analysis of the management of
"shared" fishery resources rests upon a foundation consisting ofthe economist's
dynamic model of a fishery wholly confined to the waters of a single EEZ com-
bined with the theory of dynamic games. Eor cases of non-cooperation, one turns
naturally to the theory of dynamic competitive games. Several models pertaining
to non-cooperative management of "shared" resources have now been devel-
oped. All provide essentially the same predictions.
'•'This is comparable to what Munro and Scott (1985) refer to as a Class II Common
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One such model, which the authors have employed extensively in the past
{e.g. Munro, 1990b), is that developed by Colin Clark (1980). Clark investigates a
fishery in which there are two joint owners of the resource. With the underlying
biological model being the famous Schaefer model, and assuming that the demand
for harvested fish is perfectly elastic, as well as assuming that the joint owners
have identical harvesting costs, Clark proves the following in the case of non-
cooperation. The solution to a dynamic Nash competitive game produces the
result that the fishery will be driven to the common bionomic equilibrium and that
the economic rent from the fishery will be fully dissipated. In other words, we
have an unequivocal Prisoner's Dilemma type of outcome (Clark, 1980).
It is not obvious why one should be unable to apply the analysis described
directly to the "straddling" stock problem. Such evidence that we have suggests
that the aforementioned Clark (1980) type model does in fact have considerable
predictive powers. We turn yet again to the Bering Sea groundfish fishery for an
example.
Reference has already been made to the rapid growth in harvests in the Dough-
nut Hole after 1984, from a few thousand tonnes of groundfish per annum, to over
one and a half million tonnes. By 1992, harvests in the Doughnut Hole had plum-
meted to an annual rate of 22,000 tonnes, ln August of that year, Russia and the
U.S. were joined by several distant water fishing nations operating in the region,
China. Japan, Republic of Korea, and Poland, in a resolution declaring a two year
harvest moratorium with respect to the major groundfish resource in the Dough-
nut Hole, pollock. The moratorium was to commence in 1993. The resolution
implied that the moratorium would, as well, be extended to the American and
Russian EEZs.'*^
The aforementioned resolution refers explicitly to ". . . the drastic decline of
the Aleutian Basin pollock stock and the need to ... restore the stock."'* In
short, the stock had been plundered during the period of uncontrolled, and effec-
tively non-cooperative, resource exploitation. The moratorium could be seen as a
careful bolting of the barn door after the horse had fled and gone.
The Canadian experience on the Grand Bank is also suggestive of the predic-
tive power of the aforementioned Clark type model. NAFO, which officially
commenced operations in January, 1979. appeared to work reasonably well for
several years. In 1985, however, the most important foreign partner, the EC,
broke with Canada, ostensibly in a dispute over management goals (Applebaum,
1990; Munro, 1992a). EC harvests in the NAFO governed adjacent high seas
exceeded (on an annual basis) the quotas assigned to the EC within the NAFO
framework by over 400 per cent (Munro, 1992a). The Canadian government com-
plained bitterly about the destruction of stocks off the Grand Bank by the Euro-
peans.'^
At the end of 1992, Canada and the EC signed a Memorandum of Understand-
ing, marking the renewal of Canadian-EC fisheries cooperation off Atlantic Can-
ada (Canada, 1993b). The Memorandum makes it clear that agreement was
'' "Joint Resolution of the Fifth Conference on the Conservation and Management of the
Living Marine Resources of the Central Bering Sea (August 14, 1992)."
"• Ibid.
'"^ Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "News Release,"
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reached in response to the "gravity ofthe situation,"'^ and as such makes the
agreement not dissimilar in nature to the agreement reached with respect to the
Doughnut Hole. One might describe the European willingness to sign the Mem-
orandum of Understanding as post-plunder repentance.
Let us now ask what insight the economics of cooperative management of
"shared" resources can provide us on the "straddling" stock issue. The clash
between the two schools of thought, the "consistency principle" and the Article
64 schools, would amount to little if the coastal state and relevant distant water
fishing nations were in full agreement on the appropriate management strategy.
Bargaining would have to take place over the division of the gains from the
fishery, but this would be true regardless of which school of thought was the
apparent victor.
There is, however, no assurance whatsoever that the coastal state and distant
water fishing nations will have identical management objectives. For example, the
coastal state and distant water fishing nations may have different fishing effort
costs. It can be easily shown that such differences will, in turn, lead to differing
management goals (Munro, 1979). We might also note in passing that NAFO was
faced with near breakdown by an apparent dispute over management goals.
To get us started, consider the following example, in which we adapt a simple
model taken from the economics of cooperative management of "shared" re-
sources (Munro, 1979; 1987). Suppose that the "new entrant" problem is resolved
and that in fact there is but one distant water fishing nation whose presence in the
adjacent high seas is indefinite. For the time being, we slide over the asymmetry
problem and suppose that through negotiation the distant water nation and coastal
state agree upon a division of the TAC, whatever that may happen to be.'^
The distant water fishing nation and coastal state disagree over management
strategy. They do, however, agree to bargain over a possible compromise. It is
understood that should a compromise be reached a binding agreement shall come
into force. We have thus described a cooperative game. In applying Nash's theory
of two person cooperative games, and supposing further that side payments are
not feasible, the Pareto efficient frontier in payoff space can be represented in
Figure I by the curve p = 1 - p = 0. The implications of the absence of side
payments, by the way, is that the returns from the fishery to the coastal state and
distant water fishing nation will be determined solely by the harvesting activities
of their respective fleets.
Call the coastal state and distant water fishing nation I and II respectively. Let
TT denote the payoffs to I, and 9 the payoffs to H, from following a prescribed
harvest policy through time.
The payoffs TTO and % constitute the "threat point" payoffs, i.e. the payoffs I
and II would enjoy if non-cooperation prevailed. These payoffs could be seen as
those associated with the solution to a competitive game. It is assumed, as is
reasonable, that a solution to the game is infeasible if it results in a player receiv-
ing a payoff less than its threat point payoff.
'" Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans (1993). "Memorandum of Understanding
Between the European Community and the Govemment of Canada on Fisheries Rela-
tions."
'^ When NAFO was working as it should, Canada, the EC and other distant water nations
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Figure I. Pareto efficient frontier in payoff space—without side payments.
The term p is a bargaining parameter and is a measure of the weight to be given
to the management preferences of the two players. If p = I, then the management
preferences of I are wholly dominant; if p = 0, the management preferences of II
are wholly dominant.
The Pareto efficient frontier is determined by solving the following equation
for each possible p between 0 and 1:
(1)
where PV, and /'V,, are the present values of the stream of net economic returns
from the fishery to 1 and II respectively under a given harvest regime.
The actual size of p arises in turn from the solution to the cooperative game,
which in the Nash theory of cooperative games, arises from maximizing the fol-
lowing expression:
maxCir* - (2)
where TT* and 8* are the solution payoffs.
An important implication of (2) is that the relative bargaining power of each
player depends upon the extent to which it stands to lose if there is no solution to
the cooperative game. The more a player stands to lose, other things being equal,
the weaker is its bargaining power.
Now let us observe the following. Full implementation of the "consistency
principle" is the equivalent of setting p = 1. While we would have to concede that
a solution to the game yielding p = I is not inconceivable, we would also have to
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Figure 2. Pareto efficient frontier in payoff space—with side payments.
to the game in which p = 1 will prove to be infeasible. All that is necessary is that
% exceed the 6 associated with p = I.
If side payments are possible, then the situation changes entirely. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.
With p = 1 and with side payments introduced to the game, the relevant
Pareto efficient frontier becomes the lines A - B. Bargaining is confined to a
division ofthe gains. In the example illustrated in Figure 2, a solution to the game
in which p = 1 is infeasible without side payments, but is feasible with side
payments. Thus we conclude that the possibility of success of the "consistency
principle" is certain to be greatly advanced by the introduction of side payments.
Indeed, if side payments are excluded, the outlook for the implementation and
retention of the "consistency principle" over the long term is decidedly bleak.
We know from the economic theory of the management of "shared" fishery
resources, that there are in fact numerous cases where it is optimal, with side
payments, to have 3 = 1 (or 0, depending upon circumstances). As a general rule,
it is optimal {with side payments) for the management preferences of the partner
placing the highest value in the resource to be dominant (Munro, 1990b).
One could probably expect that, in most "straddling" stock cases, the coastal
state will have the greatest stake in the resource and that it would indeed be
optimal to have a p = I type outcome. This cannot, however, stand as a general
rule. One does not require a particularly high level of imagination to produce
counter-examples, in which optimality would demand that p = O.^**
^° For example, suppose that the distant water fishing nation is a low cost harvester, while
the coastal state is a high cost harvester. Or suppose that the social rate of discount ofthe
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To this point, we have adopted an heroic assumption, namely that cooperative
arrangements once achieved will be binding. It has been pointed out many times
(e.g. Kaitala, 1985) that the assumption is often highly questionable in the context
of the management of "shared" fishery resources. We would contend that the
assumption is even more questionable for agreements governing the management
of "straddling" stocks.''
Once we relax the assumption of binding agreements, the issue becomes sig-
nificantly more complex. The first, and most obvious complexity, is that of the
threat to the agreement of cheating. This aspect of the problem does, of course,
arise with equal force in the management of "shared" resources. There is now an
extensive literature on various strategies which can be adopted to curb cheating,
e.g. by establishing a credible system of threats (see, for example, Ehtamo and
Hamalainen, 1991; Kaitala 1985; Kaitala and Pohjola, 1988). There is no obvious
reason why this analysis should be inapplicable to non-binding agreements per-
taining to "straddling" and similar stocks.
The possibility of cheating is not the only problem to emerge when the coop-
erative agreement is non-binding. There is also the problem of possible shifts in
relative bargaining strengths over time. In the context of the cooperative game,
the shifts will appear in the form of a shifting threat point. In a cooperative game
with binding agreements, the only relevant threat point is that which exists at the
commencement of the game. In a cooperative game without binding agreements,
this simple state of affairs no longer exists, with the consequence that what was
deemed to be an acceptable agreement at the commencement of the harvest
program, may well prove to be unacceptable at a later stage.
This problem was first analysed in a fisheries context by Kaitala and Pohjola
(1988). In their article, they take the example of a "shared" fishery resource with
two joint owners in which the Joint owners are identical except that the harvesting
costs of one joint owner are significantly lower than those of its fellow joint
owner. It is assumed as well that, at the commencement ofthe game, the fishery
resource is at a level which one would associate with a solution to a competitive
game, i.e. a level at which the high cost harvester is on the verge of leaving the
fishery.
The optimal solution to the cooperative game would appear to be obvious. The
low cost harvester should, in effect, buy out the high cost producer, by offering a
stream of side payments over time. If a binding agreement were feasible, the
stream of side payments would be relatively modest, since the high cost harvest-
er's bargaining power would be weak.
If the agreement is non-binding, then account must be taken of the fact that, as
the resource is restored, the high cost harvester's bargaining strength will in-
crease. With the larger resource stock, it will become more attractive for the high
cost harvester to re-enter the fishery even if that player is certain that it will be
detected quickly and that retribution will follow immediately. In effect, the threat
point will shift over time. Furthermore, the scope for effective negotiation will be
substantially reduced in comparison with the case of binding agreements. If these
facts are ignored, then the cooperative arrangement can easily collapse over time
(Kaitala and Pohjola, 1988).
^' As will be pointed out, the agreement under the NAFO Convention is a clear example
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Once again, it is difficult to see why this analysis would not be highly germane
to the '"straddling" stock problem. The history of NAFO provides an example.
NAFO, which commenced operations in early 1979, did, as we have already
noted, appear to work well for about the first six years of its existence. There were
two dominant players, Canada and the EC. If one lets Canada be Country I, then
we had a p = 1 situation, which the EC apparently accepted.
The NAFO arrangement, or agreement, was (and is) non-binding in the sense
that a party to the agreement, which deems the management regime implemented
by the NAFO Commission to be unacceptable, has the right to lodge a formal
objection. Upon lodging the objection, the party ceases to be bound by the man-
agement measures. In 1985, the EC did just that and NAFO's difficulties began
{Applebaum, 1990).
Spain and Portugal, which hitherto had not been members of NAFO and
whose fisheries relations with Canada had been subject to severe strain, became
full members ofthe EC on January 1, 1986. The EC, as a partner in NAFO, had
been changed, perhaps fundamentally. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the
EC's threat point payoff had altered significantly. One can conjecture that this
was a factor leading to a breakdown ofthe cooperative arrangement.-^
The analysis of "shared" fisheries stock management indeed does carry us
part way in examining the question of managing "straddling" stocks. The analysis
provides a reasonably clear indication of the consequences of non-cooperation
and does offer some useful insights on the current debate on the "consistency"
principle. There are, however, several important aspects of the "straddling"
stock problem which the "shared" stock analysis does not and cannot address.
Examples are provided by our specific application of "shared" stock fisheries
management analysis. First, in that application we carefully avoided the problem
of "new entrants." The problem does not arise in the management of "shared"
stocks, but can scarcely be avoided in the management of "straddling" stocks.
If the deliberations in the aforementioned U.N. conference lead to an outcome
in which new entrants are granted unrestricted access to the "straddling" stock
fishery, or an outcome in which prospective new entrants can be banned abso-
lutely, then the consequences would be readily predictable. Neither outcome is,
however, likely. If something akin to the Canadian proposal is adopted, in which
prospective new entrants are granted access, but only under special conditions,
then the consequences are far from predictable. We would then, in analytical
terms, be presented with game-theoretic problems that are far more complex than
any to be encountered in the analysis of "shared" stock management.
Secondly, in our application of "shared" fishery resource management, we
assumed that there were but two "players," a coastal state facing a single distant
water fishing nation. The assumption that there are no more than two players is
not unreasonable when examining the management of "shared" stocks. Indeed
^^ Canada and the EC have now re-established a cooperative arrangement under NAFO (n.
18). The arrangement was re-established only after the post 1985 competitive game had
played itself out, i.e. after the fishery resources had been heavily exploited. The question
which now has to be asked is how stable the new arrangement is {see n. 8). Past history is
not encouraging. Indeed, it is possible that a cycle may emerge In which the an-angement
remams In plaee while the resource is being restored, but then breaks down after the
resource has been restored. A competitive game re-emerges, to be followed by a new
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we would be hard pressed to point to examples of "shared" stock management
models involving more than two "players." The two "players" assumption is,
however, almost certain to be quite unreasonable for "straddling" stock manage-
ment. Here the norm is likely to be that of a coastal state confronting not one, but
several distant water fishing nations. One cannot predict, a priori, the nature of
the coalitions which would likely emerge or the analytical difficulties with which
we would be confronted.
It can be added that the two examples, which we have cited are not indepen-
dent of one another.
There are, of course, many other examples in which the analysis of "shared"
stock management is certain to prove inadequate in examining "straddling" stock
management. One such other example is that arising from questions of asymmetry
which we discussed earlier.
We are consequently forced to conclude that the analysis of "shared" stock
management falls far short of what we require for a full understanding of the
economic management of "straddling" stocks. An Important implication is, of
course, that the economic management of "straddling" stocks is certain to
present us with a broad menu of demanding research projects for the future.
Conclusions
Within recent years, a new and increasingly important fisheries management issue
has arisen from the implementation of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction. The issue
is the management of fishery resources to be found in both the EEZ and the
adjacent high seas. The United Nations recently convened an intergovernmental
conference on this issue, the first formal session of which is to be held in July,
1993. The fact that the conference has been convened is a reflection of the fact
that the existing Law of the Sea Convention addresses high seas fisheries man-
agement issues in a wholly unsatisfactory manner.
In this paper, we provide an introduction to the topic. We review the historical
and legal background of the issue, and then go on to make a preliminary attempt
at examining some aspects of the economics of high seas fisheries management.
We do so by adapting the economics of the management of that other form of
transboundary fishery resources, "shared" fishery resources, to the issue at
hand. The economics of "shared" fishery resources management carry us in fact
only a short part of the way. There remain important aspects of the management
of fishery resources in the adjacent high seas which demand further and extensive
research.
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